Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
提前领取社会保障与资产缓慢消耗：实验证据
Early Social Security Claiming and Slow Asset Decumulation: Experimental Evidence
摘要
Retirement behavior in the U.S. exhibits two well-documented patterns: most individuals claim Social Security benefits early, before reaching their full retirement age, and retirees decumulate their assets more slowly than predicted by standard life-cycle models. This paper provides experimental evidence that these patterns emerge even in a controlled individual decision-making environment where early claiming and slow decumulation are not optimal. In a baseline treatment calibrated to current U.S. Social Security rules, participants display both early claiming and slower-than-optimal asset decumulation. Replacing larger annuities with lump-sum incentives in two alternative treatments, as has been proposed by the U.S. Congress, accelerates asset decumulation but does not lead to delayed claiming. These findings generalize from a convenience student sample to an older sample aged 45–55 and broadly resemble the observed behavior of similarly situated respondents in the Health and Retirement Study. We show that a wealth-preservation motive can jointly generate early claiming and slow asset decumulation, consistent with the experimental evidence.
中文摘要
美国退休行为呈现出两种有充分文献记载的模式：大多数人在达到完全退休年龄之前就提前申领社会保障福利，而退休人员资产消耗的速度慢于标准生命周期模型的预测。本文提供了实验证据，表明即使在受控的个体决策环境中——提前申领和缓慢消耗资产并非最优选择——这些模式依然会出现。在依据当前美国社会保障规则校准的基准处理组中，参与者同时表现出提前申领和慢于最优水平的资产消耗。在两个替代处理组中，用一次性给付激励替代较大额年金——正如美国国会所提议的那样——会加速资产消耗，但不会导致延迟申领。这些发现从便利的学生样本推广到45至55岁的年长样本，并与健康与退休研究中处境相似的受访者的实际行为大体相似。我们表明，财富保全动因能够同时产生提前申领和缓慢的资产消耗，这与实验证据相一致。