Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
议价中的应得权利与风险投资：一项实验研究
Earned entitlements and risky investments in bargaining: an experiment
摘要
In various organizational settings, a team member is given the authority to make an investment decision that influences the value of the jointly produced surplus. We experimentally investigate the effect of asymmetric status, investment decisions, and the outcome of these decisions on bargaining behavior and outcomes. Agents’ initial contributions to the surplus are determined by their relative performances in a real-effort task. Three treatments vary in how the final surplus value is determined. We observe that when low-contributors take a risk, they are punished (rewarded) for failure (success), whereas high-contributors receive a fixed share independent of the outcome. Analysis of bargaining process variables, subjects’ communication during bargaining, and third parties’ normative judgments provides further insights into the possible mechanism behind this observation.
中文摘要
在各种组织环境中，团队成员被赋予投资决策权，该决策会影响共同产出剩余的价值。我们通过实验研究了非对称地位、投资决策及其结果对议价行为与结果的影响。代理人对于剩余的初始贡献取决于他们在真实努力任务中的相对表现。三种实验处理通过最终剩余价值的确定方式加以区分。我们观察到，当低贡献者承担风险时，其失败（成功）会受到惩罚（奖励），而高贡献者无论结果如何都能获得固定份额。对议价过程变量、被试在议价过程中的沟通内容以及第三方规范性判断的分析，进一步揭示了这一现象背后可能的作用机制。