Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
匹配市场中的有效投资、搜寻与分类
Efficient investment, search, and sorting in matching markets
摘要
We study markets where heterogeneous agents first make investment decisions and then engage in a costly search to form productive matches. The trading process is a random search and bargaining with explicit search costs. Despite potential hold‐up and matching problems, we prove that the constrained efficient allocation is an equilibrium: the agents' private incentives to invest and to accept/reject potential partners as they search are perfectly aligned with the social benefit. Furthermore, we establish a new sorting result for two‐sided markets, equilibrium existence, and conditions for uniqueness.
中文摘要
我们研究了一个市场，其中异质性主体首先做出投资决策，随后进行有成本的搜索以形成生产性匹配。交易过程是一个带有明确搜索成本的随机搜索与讨价还价过程。尽管存在潜在的敲竹杠和匹配问题，我们证明了约束有效配置是一个均衡：主体在投资以及搜索过程中接受或拒绝潜在合作伙伴的私人激励与社会福利完全一致。此外，我们为双边市场建立了一个新的分类结果，证明了均衡的存在性，并给出了唯一性的条件。