Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
负外部性下的有效概率罚款
Efficient probabilistic fines under negative externalities
摘要
We introduce a probabilistic fine scheme into a simple model of a public bad with negative externalities. As the fine scheme is probabilistic, an agent’s probability to be fined depends on its relative action level. This creates an additional positive externality that could potentially restore efficiency by neutralising the negative externality from the public bad. In our analysis we derive conditions on the primitives of the model that guarantee the existence of an efficient equilibrium. We also demonstrate that a fine scheme can always be designed in such a way that an efficient outcome is induced in equilibrium.
中文摘要
我们将一个概率罚款机制引入到一个具有负外部性的公共坏品简单模型中。由于罚款机制是概率性的，代理人被罚款的概率取决于其相对行动水平。这产生了一种额外的正外部性，有可能通过中和公共坏品带来的负外部性来恢复效率。在分析中，我们推导了模型基本要素上的条件，以保证有效均衡的存在。我们还证明，罚款机制总是可以被设计成在均衡中诱导出有效结果。