Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
危机时期中央银行的准入资格：来自法国（1863–1890年）的证据
Eligibility to the Central Bank in Times of Crises: Evidence from France, 1863–1890
摘要
We provide empirical evidence that central banks can mitigate economic crises more efficiently when they extend eligibility for their discount facility to any safe asset or solvent agent. Nineteenth-century France serves as a case study to circumvent endogeneity. Following 1863, an agricultural pandemic increased defaults outside agriculture. We exploit specificities of the discount window to create exogenous variation in central bank access. Regressions show that while the demand shock brought about by the pandemic led to an increase in defaults outside agriculture by 20 percent, this effect was significantly reduced whenever a branch office of the central bank was present.
中文摘要
我们提供了实证证据，表明当央行将贴现窗口的合格范围扩展至任何安全资产或偿付能力充足的机构时，其缓解经济危机的效率更高。以19世纪的法国作为案例研究，以规避内生性问题。1863年后，一场农业疫情导致农业以外的违约率上升。我们利用贴现窗口的特殊性，构建了央行准入的外生性变化。回归分析显示，尽管疫情引发的需求冲击使农业以外的违约率上升了20%，但每当央行设有分支机构时，这一影响便显著减弱。