Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
参与度最大化
Engagement maximization
摘要
We investigate the management of information provision to maximize user engagement. A principal sequentially reveals signals to an agent who has a limited amount of information processing capacity and can choose to exit at any time. We identify a “dilution” strategy—sending rare but highly informative signals—that maximizes user engagement. The platform's engagement metric shapes the direction and magnitude of biases in provided information relative to a user‐optimal benchmark. Even without intertemporal commitment, the platform replicates full‐commitment revenue by inducing the user's belief to remain “as uncertain as” the prior until the rare, decisive signal arrives and induces stopping. We apply our results to two contexts: an ad‐supported internet media platform and a teacher attempting to engage test‐motivated students.
中文摘要
我们研究了如何管理信息提供以最大化用户参与度。一位委托人向具有有限信息处理能力且可随时选择退出的代理人顺序揭示信号。我们识别出一种“稀释”策略——发送罕见但信息量大的信号——以最大化用户参与度。平台的参与度指标决定了所提供信息相对于用户最优基准的偏差方向与幅度。即使缺乏跨期承诺能力，平台也能通过使用户信念保持“与先验一样不确定”，直到罕见的关键信号出现并引发停止行为，从而复制完全承诺下的收益。我们将研究结果应用于两个场景：广告支持的互联网媒体平台，以及试图吸引考试驱动型学生的教师。