Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
环境事件与可持续性定价条款
Environmental Incidents and Sustainability Pricing Provisions
摘要
We investigate whether lenders use sustainability pricing provisions (SPPs) to manage borrower environmental risk. Using unexpected negative environmental incidents as shocks to environmental risk, we find that lenders are 10 percentage points less likely to include SPPs in loans to environmentally risky borrowers. Instead, they rely on conventional tools, including higher interest rates, stricter covenants, and collateral requirements. The effect weakens under strong institutional investor demand or when lenders can sell loans in secondary markets. Our study suggests that SPPs primarily help attract institutional investors rather than manage risk, with implications for the design and regulation of sustainability‐linked financial instruments.
中文摘要
我们考察贷款人是否利用可持续性定价条款（SPPs）来管理借款人的环境风险。以突发的负面环境事件作为环境风险冲击，我们发现，对于环境风险较高的借款人，贷款人在贷款中加入SPPs的可能性低10个百分点。相反，他们依赖传统工具，包括更高的利率、更严格的契约条款和抵押品要求。在机构投资者需求强劲或贷款人能够在二级市场出售贷款时，这一效应减弱。我们的研究表明，SPPs主要有助于吸引机构投资者，而非管理风险，这对可持续性挂钩金融工具的设计与监管具有启示意义。