Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
一类聚合博弈在抽样动态下的均衡选择
Equilibrium selection in a class of aggregative games under sampling dynamics
摘要
We consider a large population aggregative game with strategic complementarities. The game has multiple Nash equilibria, which can be Pareto ranked. We apply the k − sampling best response dynamic to this game. This dynamic is generated when agents best respond to the strategies of k randomly sampled opponents. We establish conditions under which the Pareto efficient equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under this dynamic. Results depend upon the relationship between benefits and costs in the game and the sample size.
中文摘要
我们考虑一个具有策略互补性的大规模总体聚合博弈。该博弈存在多个纳什均衡，且这些均衡可按帕累托排序。我们将k-抽样最优反应动态应用于此博弈。该动态产生于当参与者对随机抽取的k个对手的策略作出最优反应时。我们建立了在此动态下帕累托有效均衡几乎全局渐近稳定的条件。结果取决于博弈中的收益与成本关系以及样本大小。