Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
无共同先验的不完全信息博弈中贝叶斯均衡的存在性
Existence of Bayesian Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games without Common Priors
摘要
This paper focuses on finite-player incomplete information games where players may hold mutually inconsistent beliefs without a common prior. We introduce absolute continuity of beliefs, extending the classical notion of absolute continuity of information in Milgrom and Weber (1985), and prove that Bayesian equilibria exist in a broad class of games, including those with discontinuous payoffs. Examples illustrate the scope and implications of our findings.
中文摘要
本文关注有限参与者的不完全信息博弈，其中参与者可能持有互不一致且不存在共同先验的信念。我们引入了信念的绝对连续性，扩展了Milgrom和Weber（1985）中经典的信息绝对连续性概念，并证明了在广泛的一类博弈中贝叶斯均衡的存在性，包括具有不连续收益的博弈。示例说明了我们发现的范围和意义。