Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
匹配市场中短视-远视稳定集的存在性
Existence of Myopic‐Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets
摘要
In the context of one‐to‐one matching markets, we study myopic‐farsighted stable sets , which are internally and externally stable when myopic agents consider immediate payoffs from their deviations, while farsighted agents anticipate counter‐deviations and consider final payoffs. We constructively prove the existence of a (rational expectations) myopic‐farsighted stable set, in which farsighted agents receive a single payoff while myopic agents may receive multiple payoffs. Our existence result extends to settings with enforcing coalitions of arbitrary size, yielding coalitional myopic‐farsighted stable sets , and to settings where not all members of an enforcing coalition must strictly gain, yielding myopic‐farsighted weakly stable sets . When all farsighted agents have unit demand, our results also extend to many‐to‐one matching markets. As a key corollary, we provide a foundation for the efficiency‐adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm by showing that its outcome constitutes a singleton myopic‐farsighted stable set when one side is farsighted and the other is myopic.
中文摘要
在一对一匹配市场的背景下，我们研究了近视-远视稳定集，当近视主体考虑其偏离行为的即时收益，而远视主体预期反偏离并考虑最终收益时，该集合在内部和外部均保持稳定。我们构造性地证明了（理性预期）近视-远视稳定集的存在性，其中远视主体获得单一收益，而近视主体可能获得多重收益。我们的存在性结果扩展至具有任意规模执行联盟的情形，从而产生联盟性近视-远视稳定集，并进一步扩展至执行联盟中并非所有成员必须严格获益的情形，从而产生近视-远视弱稳定集。当所有远视主体具有单位需求时，我们的结果也适用于多对一匹配市场。作为一个关键推论，我们为效率调整的延迟接受算法提供了理论基础，表明当一方为远视而另一方为近视时，其结果构成一个单元素近视-远视稳定集。