Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
基于消费者偏见的二部定价中的剥削与筛选
Exploitation and Screening by Two‐Part Tariffs With Biased Beliefs of Consumers
摘要
This paper examines the design of two‐part tariffs when consumers have biased beliefs about their demand. Two forms of biases are analyzed: overpessimism, where high‐valuation consumers underestimate demand, and overoptimism, where low‐valuation consumers overestimate it. With overpessimists, marginal prices for low types are distorted upward: in monopoly, due to both exploitation and the rent‐efficiency trade‐off, and in competition, solely due to exploitation. With overoptimists, firms set marginal prices for high types below cost to exploit optimism. A monopolist has incentives to educate overpessimistic consumers but may not wish to educate overoptimistic consumers. By contrast, in competition, firms lack incentives to educate any biased consumers. Debiasing policies have contrasting effects: they may reduce welfare in a monopoly but unambiguously improve welfare under competition.
中文摘要
本文考察了当消费者对其需求存在有偏信念时两部定价的设计问题。本文分析了两种形式的偏差：过度悲观，即高估值消费者低估需求；以及过度乐观，即低估值消费者高估需求。在存在过度悲观者的情况下，低类型消费者的边际价格被向上扭曲：在垄断中，这既源于剥削，也源于租金—效率权衡；在竞争中，则仅源于剥削。在存在过度乐观者的情况下，企业将高类型消费者的边际价格设定在成本以下，以利用乐观偏差。垄断者具有教育过度悲观消费者的激励，但可能并不愿意教育过度乐观消费者。相比之下，在竞争中，企业缺乏教育任何有偏消费者的激励。去偏政策具有相反的效果：在垄断中，它们可能降低福利，但在竞争下则明确改善福利。