Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
利用机器：囚徒困境中人类与人工代理的合作
Exploiting the machine: Human cooperation with artificial agents in prisoner's dilemma
摘要
We conduct a laboratory experiment using one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD) games to study cooperation with an artificial agent that both mimics human behavior and acts on behalf of a human stakeholder. Controlling for beliefs, emotions, and personal characteristics, we investigate the underlying drivers of cooperation differences between a human baseline (“Humans”) and the artificial agents (“AA”) treatment. We find that the likelihood of cooperation does not depend on whether the counterpart is human or artificial in the one-shot PD games. In the RPD games, however, cooperation is less likely when participants play with an artificial agent than when they play with other humans. By combining individual decisions and beliefs, we identify an “exploiting-the-partner” behavior: choosing to defect while expecting the partner to cooperate. Our results suggest that participants are persistently more likely to exploit artificial agents than human partners when they anticipate cooperation, including across repeated interactions and even if the artificial agent is acting on behalf of a human counterpart.
中文摘要
我们开展了一项实验室实验，采用一次性囚徒困境（PD）和有限重复囚徒困境（RPD）博弈，研究一种既模仿人类行为又代表人类利益相关者行事的人工代理中的合作行为。在控制信念、情绪和个人特征的情况下，我们考察了人类基线（“Humans”）与人工代理（“AA”）处理之间合作差异的潜在驱动因素。我们发现，在一次性PD博弈中，合作的可能性并不取决于对手是人类还是人工代理。然而，在RPD博弈中，参与者与人工代理博弈时，合作的可能性低于与其他人类博弈时。通过结合个体决策与信念，我们识别出一种“利用伙伴”行为：选择背叛，同时预期伙伴会合作。我们的结果表明，当参与者预期对方会合作时，他们持续更可能利用人工代理而非人类伙伴，包括在重复互动中，甚至当人工代理代表人类对手行事时也是如此。