Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
困境竞争中的反馈与传染
Feedback and Contagion through Distressed Competition
摘要
Firms tend to compete more aggressively when facing financial distress. This intensified competition reduces profit margins, pushing them further into distress and adversely affecting their industry peers. To study such feedback and contagion effects, we incorporate strategic competition in a dynamic model with long‐term defaultable debt, exploring various peer interactions such as predation and price wars. The feedback effect represents a novel source of financial distress costs associated with leverage, which helps explain the negative profitability‐leverage relation across industries. Owing to the contagion effect, firms' optimal leverage is often excessively high from an industry perspective, undermining the industry's financial stability.
中文摘要
企业在面临财务困境时往往竞争得更加激进。这种加剧的竞争会压缩利润率，使企业进一步陷入困境，并对其行业同伴产生不利影响。为研究此类反馈与传染效应，我们将策略性竞争纳入一个包含长期可违约债务的动态模型，考察 predation 和价格战等多种同伴互动形式。反馈效应代表了一种与杠杆相关的新型财务困境成本来源，有助于解释跨行业中盈利能力与杠杆之间的负相关关系。由于传染效应，从行业视角看，企业的最优杠杆往往过高，从而削弱行业的金融稳定性。