Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
金融排斥、财政制度与货币政策的影响范围
Financial exclusion, fiscal regimes, and the incidence of monetary policy
摘要
Does the monetary–fiscal policy mix that stabilizes an economy depend on how many of its people are outside the financial system? I develop a two-agent New Keynesian model calibrated to Ghana where financially included (FI) households hold public debt and transact through mobile money. In contrast, financially excluded (FE) households live hand to mouth. The central result is distributional. The fiscal regime determines who bears the cost of monetary policy, which falls on FI households when the government finances deficits and on FE households when it stabilizes debt. The welfare of both households moves in opposition; aggregate models conceal a conflict that widens sharply with exclusion. The ratio of variance in included to excluded welfare increases from 1.3 to 7.0 as the excluded share increases from 60 to 80 percent. Moreover, where labor markets are flexible, as in largely informal economies, the same interaction governs whether a stable equilibrium exists. As financial inclusion deepens and labor markets formalize in developing economies, the policy mix that stabilizes an economy and shares risk fairly must change with it.
中文摘要
稳定经济的货币—财政政策组合是否取决于有多少人处于金融体系之外？我构建了一个针对加纳校准的两主体新凯恩斯模型，其中金融纳入（FI）家庭持有公共债务并通过移动货币进行交易。相比之下，金融排斥（FE）家庭则过着手到口的生活。核心结果是分配性的。财政制度决定了谁承担货币政策的成本：当政府为赤字融资时，成本落在FI家庭身上；当政府稳定债务时，成本落在FE家庭身上。两类家庭的福利呈相反方向变动；总量模型掩盖了一种冲突，而这种冲突随着排斥程度的上升而急剧扩大。随着被排斥比例从60%上升到80%，纳入家庭与排斥家庭福利方差之比从1.3增加到7.0。此外，在劳动力市场灵活的情况下，如在 largely informal economies 中，同样的相互作用决定了是否存在稳定均衡。随着发展中经济体金融纳入加深、劳动力市场正规化，稳定经济并公平分担风险的政策组合也必须随之改变。