Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
财政问责：制度约束与行为摩擦
Fiscal accountability: Institutional discipline and behavioral frictions
摘要
We develop and test a model of fiscal accountability in which parties compete over integrated fiscal platforms comprising taxes, public-good provision, and political rents. The theory shows how power-sharing institutions discipline rent extraction: greater disproportionality in the vote-to-power mapping increases the political cost of marginal vote losses and, along the interior equilibrium, reduces rents, raises public-good provision, and improves voter welfare. We test these predictions in a laboratory election environment that observes both candidate platform choices and voter behavior. The evidence supports the central institutional mechanism. The disproportional rule reduces proposed rents, shifts platforms toward public-good provision, and increases aggregate voter welfare. Accountability, however, remains incomplete. Voters respond to fiscal performance, but less than the rational (automated) benchmark; partisan bias dampens policy responsiveness among opposing voters; and a public-good “gambit” makes rents less electorally costly when bundled with public-good gains.
中文摘要
我们构建并检验了一个财政问责模型，其中政党围绕由税收、公共品供给和政治租金构成的综合财政平台展开竞争。该理论揭示了权力分享制度如何约束租金抽取：选举得票与政治权力映射中比例失调程度越高，边际选票损失的政治成本就越大，并且在内部均衡处，这会降低租金、提高公共品供给并改善选民福利。我们在一个实验室选举环境中检验了这些预测，该环境同时观察候选人的平台选择与选民行为。证据支持核心的制度机制。比例失调规则降低了所提出的租金，使平台向公共品供给倾斜，并提高了选民的总福利。然而，问责仍然不完整。选民会对财政绩效作出反应，但反应弱于理性（自动化）基准；党派偏见削弱了对立选民的政策响应性；而公共品的“策略性让步”使得当租金与公共品收益捆绑时，其选举成本降低。