Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文

竞赛中团队的形成:团队间与团队内不平等的权衡

Formation of teams in contests: tradeoffs between inter- and intra-team inequalities

Hideo Konishi, Chen-Yu Pan, Dimitar Simeonov

来源
Social Choice and Welfare · 期刊论文
本站首次发现
2026-06-14 17:05
日期信息
官方在线 2026-06-03 · 来源:RSS
主题
公共与政治经济学国际贸易不平等

摘要

We consider a team contest in which players make efforts to compete with other teams for a prize, and players of the winning team divide the prize according to a prize-sharing rule. Assuming that players differ in their abilities and their abilities are observable, we analyze which team structure realizes by allowing players to move across teams. A team structure is stable if there is no successful head-hunting opportunity. We show that if all teams employ the egalitarian sharing rule, then the complete sorting of players according to their abilities occurs, and inter-team inequality becomes the largest. In contrast, if all teams employ a substantially unequal sharing rule, there is a stable team structure with a small inter-team inequality and a large intra-team inequality. This result illustrates a trade-off between intra-team inequality and inter-team inequality in forming teams.

中文摘要

我们考察一种团队竞赛,其中队员为争夺奖品而与其他团队竞争,获胜团队的队员依据某种奖品分配规则分享奖品。假设队员能力各异且这些能力可被观察,我们分析允许队员跨团队流动时,何种团队结构得以实现。若不存在成功的挖角机会,则团队结构是稳定的。我们证明,若所有团队采用均等分配规则,则队员将按能力完全分层,团队间不平等达到最大。相反,若所有团队采用显著不均等的分配规则,则存在一种稳定的团队结构,其团队间不平等较小而团队内不平等较大。这一结果揭示了团队形成过程中团队内不平等与团队间不平等之间的权衡关系。