Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
完全自由裁量权不可避免
Full Discretion is Inevitable
摘要
This article studies a dynamic project-selection game between a Principal and an Agent with conflicting interests. Only the Agent knows what projects are feasible. In each period before a project is selected, the Principal imposes a restriction set. The Agent can select any feasible project within this set, thereby ending the game. The Agent can also stay silent, in which case the game will proceed to the next period. Importantly, the Principal cannot commit to her future restriction sets. I show that when the Agent is sufficiently patient, the Principal fully delegates to the Agent in the unique equilibrium.
中文摘要
本文研究了一个委托人与代理人之间利益冲突的动态项目选择博弈。只有代理人知晓哪些项目是可行的。在每个项目被选定之前的每个时期，委托人施加一个限制集合。代理人可以在该集合内选择任何可行的项目，从而结束博弈。代理人也可以保持沉默，在这种情况下，博弈将进入下一时期。重要的是，委托人无法承诺其未来的限制集合。我证明，当代理人足够有耐心时，在唯一均衡中，委托人会将决策权完全委托给代理人。