Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
通过失去控制来获得控制
Gaining Control by Losing Control
摘要
We study an agency model with two sequential tasks, an initial task (e.g., development), which requires unverifiable effort, and a final task (e.g., production), whose environment is privately known only to the agent. The principal can either perform the initial task herself (hands-on management) or delegate it to the agent (hands-off management). We show that when the cost of effort for the initial task is low, hands-on management is optimal, as it mitigates the distortion caused by agent shirking. However, as the cost of effort increases, hands-off management becomes preferable. Under hands-on management, the principal's inability to commit leads her to overinvest in the initial task, which in turn exacerbates inefficiencies in the final task due to the agent's information rent. In contrast, hands-off management, despite the agent's shirking incentive, helps better target effort toward favorable project environments. Our analysis also reveals how effort costs can create systematic biases toward one management style over the other.
中文摘要
我们研究了一个包含两个连续任务的代理模型：初始任务（如开发），需要不可验证的努力；以及最终任务（如生产），其环境仅由代理私下知晓。委托人可以选择亲自执行初始任务（亲力亲为式管理），或将其委托给代理（放手式管理）。我们表明，当初始任务的努力成本较低时，亲力亲为式管理为最优，因为它能缓解代理偷懒所导致的扭曲。然而，随着努力成本的增加，放手式管理变得更为可取。在亲力亲为式管理下，委托人无法承诺会导致其对初始任务过度投资，进而因代理的信息租金而加剧最终任务中的效率低下。相比之下，放手式管理尽管存在代理的偷懒激励，却有助于将努力更精准地投向有利的项目环境。我们的分析还揭示了努力成本如何系统性地偏向于某一种管理风格。