Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
在线拍卖中的麻烦成本
Hassle Costs in Online Auctions
摘要
Online auctions have declined in popularity, often due to their high transaction costs. This paper focuses on one such cost: the hassle cost of bidding in often prolonged online auctions. We develop a structural model of ascending auctions with costly bidding that resembles a war of attrition. We show that even in private value settings, bidders strategically lower their bids to avoid hassle. Using data from a large online auto auction platform, we estimate that the average winner incurs hassle costs equivalent to 1.7% of the vehicle’s sale price, while sellers lose 5.0% in revenue due to bid-shading. Counterfactual simulations suggest that higher reserve prices can limit unproductive bidding and partially offset the loss.
中文摘要
在线拍卖的受欢迎程度有所下降，这往往归因于其高昂的交易成本。本文聚焦于其中一种成本：在通常漫长的在线拍卖中出价所带来的麻烦成本。我们构建了一个带有昂贵出价的结构性升价拍卖模型，该模型类似于消耗战。我们证明，即使在私有价值情境下，竞标者也会策略性地降低出价以避免麻烦。利用一个大型在线汽车拍卖平台的数据，我们估计平均获胜者承担的麻烦成本相当于车辆售价的1.7%，而卖家因出价缩减损失了5.0%的收入。反事实模拟表明，更高的保留价可以限制非生产性出价，并部分抵消这一损失。