Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
支撑绿色能源：印度太阳能市场中的交易对手风险
Holding up Green Energy: Counterparty Risk in the Indian Solar Power Market
摘要
This paper studies how the risk of hold‐up affects procurement. I use data on the universe of solar power auctions in India. The Indian context allows clean estimates of counterparty risk, because solar plants set up in the same states, by the same firms, are procured in auctions intermediated by either risky states themselves or the trusted central government. I find that the counterparty risk of an average state increases solar prices by 10%. This risk premium sharply reduces investment, because demand for green energy is elastic. Contract intermediation by the central government eliminates the counterparty risk premium.
中文摘要
本文研究了敲竹杠风险如何影响采购。我利用印度太阳能电力拍卖的全面数据进行分析。印度的情况使得对交易对手风险的估计变得清晰，因为同一企业在同一州建立的太阳能电站，其拍卖由风险较高的州政府或信誉良好的中央政府中介进行。我发现，平均州的交易对手风险使太阳能价格上升了10%。这一风险溢价显著减少了投资，因为绿色能源需求具有弹性。中央政府的中介合同消除了交易对手风险溢价。