Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
部门构成如何影响自由贸易协定对全球关税自由化的作用？
How do sectoral compositions affect the impact of FTAs on global tariff liberalization?
摘要
This paper examines the effects of differences in sectoral compositions between countries on the liberalization of global tariffs in the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium sense. Using a static tariff-setting game with endogenous trade agreements, I develop a competing exporters model with three countries that differ in their sectoral compositions. I consider two settings that are differentiated by the type of trade agreements that countries can sign: free trade agreements (FTAs) and multilateral trade agreements, i.e., no FTAs. I study both symmetric and asymmetric differences in sectoral compositions across countries and find that, contrary to earlier results based on economic size asymmetries, FTAs act as stumbling blocks to the multilateral trading system when countries sufficiently differ in their sectoral compositions. This result is caused by the existence of a free riding incentive. Lastly, I show that permitting internal tariffs in FTAs typically strengthens the free riding incentive under symmetric sectoral differences, and in the asymmetric case may either mitigate or exacerbate the stumbling-block problem depending on countries’ sectoral compositions.
中文摘要
本文考察了国家间部门构成差异对全球关税自由化的影响，在联盟证明纳什均衡的意义上进行分析。通过一个具有内生贸易协定的静态关税设定博弈，我构建了一个包含三个部门构成不同的国家的竞争性出口商模型。我考虑了两种设置，其区别在于国家可以签署的贸易协定类型：自由贸易协定（FTAs）和多边贸易协定，即无自由贸易协定的情况。我研究了国家间部门构成的对称和不对称差异，并发现，与先前基于经济规模不对称的结果相反，当国家在部门构成上存在显著差异时，自由贸易协定成为多边贸易体系的绊脚石。这一结果源于搭便车激励的存在。最后，我表明，在对称部门差异下，允许自由贸易协定中的内部关税通常会增强搭便车激励，而在不对称情况下，则可能根据国家的部门构成减轻或加剧绊脚石问题。