Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
大学招生中的可选考试政策如何不成比例地损害来自弱势背景的高成就申请者
How Test Optional Policies in College Admissions Disproportionately Harm High Achieving Applicants from Disadvantaged Backgrounds
摘要
We analyze data from one elite institution and find that test score optional policies harm the likelihood of admission for high achieving applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds. Under test optional policies, these applicants submit test scores at too low a rate; they more than double their admissions probability (from 2.9 percent to 7.2 percent) by reporting scores. Our findings suggest that, more than commonly understood, elite institutions interpret test scores in the context of an applicant’s background. Thus, availability of test scores on an application can promote rather than hinder social mobility.
中文摘要
我们分析了一所精英院校的数据，发现考试分数可选政策损害了来自弱势背景的高成就申请者的录取机会。在考试分数可选政策下，这些申请者提交分数的比例过低；若提交分数，其录取概率将提升一倍以上（从2.9%升至7.2%）。我们的研究结果表明，精英院校在解读考试分数时，比普遍认知更注重申请者的背景信息。因此，申请材料中提供考试分数反而能促进而非阻碍社会流动性。