Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
如何防止联合信息封锁：防封锁扩散拍卖研究
How to prevent joint information blocking: A study of blocking-proof diffusion auctions
摘要
Joint information blocking is the strategic behavior of a group of buyers that blocks competitors’ information. In the framework of diffusion auctions, joint information blocking employed by buyers’ tacit collusion can avoid competitive bidding, which leads to inefficiency of the auction mechanism. In this paper, blocking-proofness is introduced and investigated. Blocking-proofness means that buyers cannot benefit from joint information blocking, that is, from deleting diffusion relations to other buyers in the network. It is shown that blocking-proofness and incentive compatibility are independent, and both are necessary conditions for collusion-proofness. Finally, the blocking-proof diffusion auctions with monotonic allocation policies are fully characterized, and the independence of the conditions is discussed.
中文摘要
联合信息封锁是指一组买家采取的策略性行为，旨在阻碍竞争对手获取信息。在扩散拍卖框架下，买家通过默契合谋实施联合信息封锁，可规避竞争性报价，从而导致拍卖机制效率低下。本文引入并研究了防封锁性这一概念。防封锁性意味着买家无法通过联合信息封锁获益，即无法通过删除网络中与其他买家的扩散关系来获利。研究表明，防封锁性与激励相容性相互独立，且两者均为防合谋性的必要条件。最后，本文完整刻画了具有单调分配策略的防封锁扩散拍卖，并探讨了各条件的独立性。