Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
通过政党的实施
Implementation via political parties
摘要
We address the implementation of public policies (alternatives) when the feasible set is unknown to the planner. The implementing agents are the political parties, who know the feasible set. They care about the implemented alternative, which reflects their ideology, and their share in parliament and office. They face a mechanism that, given the alternatives proposed by all parties, asks the voters to rank them and determines the chosen alternative and the shares in parliament and office. We identify conditions on parties’ preferences that guarantee the socially optimal policy is the outcome of the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the electoral game played by the parties. The existence of the equilibrium does not require any assumptions about the parties’ ideology. To ensure uniqueness, shares must prevail over ideology: office or parliamentary shares in two-party systems, and strictly office shares in systems with more than two parties.
中文摘要
本文研究在规划者无法获知可行集的情况下公共政策（备选方案）的实施问题。实施主体为政党，其了解可行集。政党既关心所实施反映其意识形态的备选方案，也关心其在议会和执政中的份额。它们面对一种机制：该机制根据所有政党提出的备选方案，要求选民对其进行排序，并决定所选备选方案以及在议会和执政中的份额。我们识别出政党偏好上的条件，以保证社会最优政策是政党所进行选举博弈的唯一纯策略纳什均衡结果。该均衡的存在性不需要关于政党意识形态的任何假设。为确保唯一性，份额必须优先于意识形态：在两党制中为执政份额或议会份额，在多于两党的制度中为严格的执政份额。