Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
激励与动机挤占应对慢性消耗性疾病：一项针对阿尔伯塔省猎人的实验
Incentives and motivational crowding to address chronic wasting disease: An experiment with Alberta hunters
摘要
Behavioral interventions, for example, through the use of incentives and information, are widely used by policymakers to induce welfare‐improving behavior. When these interventions are used in specific contexts such as environmental conservation, individual knowledge, experience, and attitudes can lead to motivational crowding and may limit their efficacy. In this article, we investigate how incentives and information affect the behavior of recreational hunters in Alberta when tasked with curbing the spread of chronic wasting disease (CWD), a deadly wildlife disease. Embedded in a framed multiple‐threshold public goods game, we test hunters’ responses to various real‐world policy instruments designed to increase hunting trips. We find that hunters take more trips (increase their contribution to the public good) in response to monetary incentives framed as extra hunting tags but do not respond to direct monetary rewards. These findings advance our knowledge of how incentives can lead to motivational crowding and provide meaningful policy guidance for wildlife management and other environmental programs.
中文摘要
行为干预，例如通过激励和信息手段，被政策制定者广泛用于引导福利改善行为。当这些干预措施应用于环境保护等特定情境时，个体知识、经验和态度可能导致动机挤兑，从而限制其效果。本文探讨了在阿尔伯塔省，激励和信息如何影响休闲猎人在遏制慢性消耗性疾病（CWD）——一种致命野生动物疾病——传播过程中的行为。通过嵌入一个框架化的多阈值公共物品博弈实验，我们测试了猎人对旨在增加狩猎出行次数的各种现实政策工具的反应。研究发现，猎人在面对以额外狩猎标签形式呈现的货币激励时，会增加出行次数（即增加对公共物品的贡献），但对直接货币奖励并无响应。这些发现深化了我们对激励如何引发动机挤兑的理解，并为野生动物管理及其他环境项目提供了有意义的政策指导。