Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
主观评价中的不公平厌恶：来自足球裁判决策的证据
Inequity aversion in subjective evaluations: evidence from referees' decisions in soccer
摘要
Subjective evaluations in many contexts can be influenced by decision-makers' social preferences. We investigate this phenomenon using data from soccer referees' decisions. Referees are expected to evaluate each episode independently, regardless of prior calls. However, if referees dislike creating inequities between teams, they might compensate for earlier decisions. For instance, after awarding a penalty to the home team, they may apply a higher threshold when awarding a second penalty to the same team while lowering the threshold for the away team. Using play-by-play data from 21,400 matches in major European leagues, we find that referees exhibit a strong preference for equality: they increase the probability of awarding a penalty or issuing a red or yellow card against a team if the opposing team was previously subject to a similar decision, and reduce that probability if the team itself was previously subject to one. Finally, focusing on injury time, we show that referees tend to extend it when either the home or the away team is behind, further suggesting that referees have a preference for treating both teams equally.
中文摘要
在许多情境中，主观评价可能受到决策者社会偏好的影响。我们利用足球裁判判罚的数据来研究这一现象。裁判本应独立评估每一次事件，而不受此前判罚的影响。然而，如果裁判不喜欢在球队之间制造不平等，他们可能会对先前的判罚进行补偿。例如，在判给主队一个点球后，他们在判给同一支球队第二个点球时可能会采用更高的门槛，同时降低客队的门槛。我们使用欧洲主要联赛21,400场比赛的逐回合数据发现，裁判表现出强烈的平等偏好：如果对方球队此前曾受到类似判罚，裁判会增加对该球队判罚点球或出示红黄牌的概率；而如果该球队自身此前曾受到类似判罚，则会降低这一概率。最后，我们聚焦于伤停补时，表明当主队或客队落后时，裁判倾向于延长补时，这进一步表明裁判具有平等对待双方的偏好。