Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
信息获取与不可知风险的责任
Information acquisition and liability for unknowable risk
摘要
Some product harm is exogenously unknowable until after some consumers have suffered the harm. There is a legal debate over whether such unknowable harm to these early consumers should be given immunity. This article finds that when the seller bears strict liability with compensatory damage on the unknowable harm, the seller’s incentive is distorted. There is an incentive to secretly over-test the product, so the seller can drop or attempt to fix a harmful product to reduce the public’s detection. At the same time, there is also an incentive to under-test the product to avoid a negative test result being leaked out by a whistle-blower. To achieve the socially optimal outcome under strict liability, the damages on the unknowable harm must be punitive and tailored to the events. Granting immunity for unknowable harm can remove inefficiency without complicated damages. (JEL K13, D83).
中文摘要
部分产品危害在消费者遭受损害之前，从外部无法预知。关于此类早期消费者所遭受的不可知损害是否应给予豁免，存在法律争议。本文发现，当卖方对不可知损害承担严格责任并支付补偿性赔偿时，卖方的激励会被扭曲。卖方有动机秘密过度测试产品，以便放弃或尝试修复有害产品，从而减少公众的察觉。同时，也存在动机不足测试产品，以避免负面测试结果被举报者泄露。为实现严格责任下的社会最优结果，对不可知损害的赔偿必须具有惩罚性，并与具体事件相匹配。对不可知损害给予豁免，可以在无需复杂赔偿机制的情况下消除效率低下问题。（JEL K13, D83）