Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
道德风险下的共同价值拍卖信息设计：在OCS租赁拍卖中的应用
Information Design in Common Value Auction With Moral Hazard: Application to OCS Leasing Auctions
摘要
This paper explores the impact of information design on the auctioneer's revenue in the U.S. offshore oil/gas lease auctions where, post‐auction, the winner decides whether to explore the auctioned tract and must pay the government a royalty on its production value. I first document that there is a positive correlation between the exploration rate and publicly observed losing bids. This suggests that the winning bidder uses the rivals' bids to infer their private information about the tract's potential. I then characterize the equilibrium bidding strategy when the auctioneer designs and commits to how to reveal information on losing bids to the winning bidder. Counterfactual exercises reveal that alternative bid disclosure policies significantly improve auctioneer revenue.
中文摘要
本文探讨了信息设计对美国海上油气租赁拍卖中拍卖方收益的影响。在拍卖结束后，中标者需决定是否对拍卖地块进行勘探，并须按其生产价值向政府支付特许权使用费。我首先发现，勘探率与公开观察到的未中标报价之间存在正相关关系。这表明，中标者利用竞争对手的报价来推断其关于地块潜力的私人信息。随后，我刻画了当拍卖方设计并承诺如何向中标者披露未中标报价信息时的均衡投标策略。反事实分析表明，替代性的报价披露政策能够显著提高拍卖方收益。