Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
重复互动中的信息设计
Information Design in Repeated Interaction
摘要
How does a long-term relationship affect communication among economic entities? In this paper, we study dynamic information design in a simple “agreement game” with repeated interaction, where the state is imperfectly persistent. Disclosing information now influences future belief evolution, which results in a novel distortion relative to the static counterpart. We observe that the interaction of the players’ patience and the state’s persistence parameters is crucial in determining the optimal mechanism. Though an efficient mechanism is optimal with sufficiently small or large patience, with intermediate levels of patience, optimal mechanisms exhibit excessive agreement when states are sufficiently persistent, while they exhibit excessive disagreement with less persistence. How does a long-term relationship affect communication among economic entities? In this paper, we study dynamic information design in a simple “agreement game” with repeated interaction, where the state is imperfectly persistent. Disclosing information now influences future belief evolution, which results in a novel distortion relative to the static counterpart. We observe that the interaction of the players’ patience and the state’s persistence parameters is crucial in determining the optimal mechanism, where both excessive agreement and excessive disagreement can arise. How does a long-term relationship affect communication among economic entities? We study dynamic information design in a repeated “agreement game”, where the state is imperfectly persistent. Information disclosed today influences future beliefs, which results in a novel distortion relative to the static counterpart. We characterize how the optimal mechanism varies with the players’ patience and the state’s persistence. When players are very impatient or very patient, an efficient mechanism is optimal. If their patience is intermediate and the state’s persistence is high, the optimal mechanism may suppress bad news entirely, recommending agreement even when both players would prefer disagreement. If the state’s persistence is also intermediate, the optimal mechanism may do the opposite: recommend disagreement even when both players would prefer agreement, to reduce the informativeness of the bad news conveyed by disagreement.
中文摘要
长期关系如何影响经济主体之间的沟通？本文在一个具有重复互动的简单“协议博弈”中研究动态信息设计，其中状态具有不完全持续性。当前披露信息会影响未来信念的演化，从而相对于静态对应情形产生一种新的扭曲。我们观察到，参与者的耐心与状态持续性参数之间的相互作用对于决定最优机制至关重要。尽管在耐心足够小或足够大时，有效机制是最优的，但在中等耐心水平下，当状态足够持续时，最优机制会表现出过度协议，而当持续性较低时，则会表现出过度分歧。长期关系如何影响经济主体之间的沟通？本文在一个具有重复互动的简单“协议博弈”中研究动态信息设计，其中状态具有不完全持续性。当前披露信息会影响未来信念的演化，从而相对于静态对应情形产生一种新的扭曲。我们观察到，参与者的耐心与状态持续性参数之间的相互作用对于决定最优机制至关重要，其中过度协议和过度分歧均可能出现。长期关系如何影响经济主体之间的沟通？我们研究一个重复“协议博弈”中的动态信息设计，其中状态具有不完全持续性。今天披露的信息会影响未来信念，从而相对于静态对应情形产生一种新的扭曲。我们刻画了最优机制如何随参与者的耐心和状态的持续性而变化。当参与者非常不耐心或非常耐心时，有效机制是最优的。如果他们的耐心处于中等水平且状态的持续性较高，最优机制可能完全压制坏消息，即使双方都更偏好分歧也建议协议。如果状态的持续性也处于中等水平，最优机制可能采取相反做法：即使双方都更偏好协议也建议分歧，以降低分歧所传达的坏消息的信息量。