Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
创新与初创企业收购
Innovation and Startup Acquisition
摘要
In this paper, we consider two platforms that compete for the development of a new product to integrate into their ecosystems. The new product can be developed either in-house by the platforms or by an independent startup active only in the technology market. The technology of the startup can be transferred to the platforms either exclusively (startup acquisition) or non-exclusively (licensing). A platform acquires the startup’s technology either because it failed to develop the technology itself or to prevent a rival from acquiring it (a killer acquisition). The presence of the startup affects the platforms’ R&D efforts through an insurance effect, which reduces the cost of failed innovation, and a competition effect, which diminishes the returns to innovation. The magnitude of these effects depends on the merger policy decided by the competition authorities. We show that allowing acquisitions stimulates platform innovation, but at the cost of a more concentrated market structure.
中文摘要
本文考察了两个平台为将新产品整合进其生态系统而展开的竞争。新产品既可由平台内部开发，也可由一家仅在技术市场活跃的独立初创企业开发。初创企业的技术可以排他性（即初创企业被收购）或非排他性（即许可）方式转让给平台。平台收购初创企业技术的原因，要么是自身开发失败，要么是为了阻止竞争对手获得该技术（即“杀手级收购”）。初创企业的存在通过保险效应（降低创新失败的成本）和竞争效应（减少创新的回报）影响平台的研发投入。这些效应的强弱取决于竞争当局制定的并购政策。我们表明，允许收购会刺激平台创新，但代价是市场结构更加集中。