Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
创新、许可与竞争：来自转基因作物的证据
Innovation, Licensing, and Competition: Evidence From Genetically Engineered Crops
摘要
We provide a novel empirical analysis of the role of technology licensing, between competitors, for genetically engineered (GE) traits in the US seed industry. We extend the standard differentiated-product Bertrand pricing model to include trait licensing, which permits us to recover marginal costs and (otherwise unobserved) royalty rates. Estimation relies on a large dataset of farm-level seed purchases. We find that markups over marginal cost are sizeable, and royalties for GE traits contribute a non-trivial amount to these markups. Licensing GE traits to competitors benefits all seed sellers and, notwithstanding its strategic effect on pricing, also increases total market surplus.
中文摘要
我们针对美国种子行业中，竞争对手之间基因工程（GE）性状技术许可的作用，提供了一项新颖的实证分析。我们将标准差异化产品伯特兰定价模型扩展至包含性状许可，从而能够恢复边际成本和（原本不可观测的）特许权使用费率。估计依赖于农场层面种子购买的大型数据集。我们发现，边际成本之上的加成幅度显著，且GE性状的特许权使用费对这些加成贡献了不可忽视的部分。将GE性状许可给竞争对手有利于所有种子销售商，并且，尽管其对定价具有战略影响，也增加了总市场剩余。