Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
发明人流动性与创新：基于竞业禁止协议的证据
Innovation through Inventor Mobility: Evidence from Non-Compete Agreements
摘要
Proponents of labor mobility restrictions argue that innovation incentives more than offset harm to workers. Yet the causal effect of such policies on innovation is an open empirical question. Leveraging plausibly exogenous state-level changes in the enforceability of noncompete agreements, we find a significant negative effect on innovation. This effect is even larger for the most novel and innovative patents and firms. Further analysis shows that these negative effects on innovation cannot be explained by entry alone and instead likely result from reduced knowledge flows. Our findings suggest that labor mobility plays a crucial role in spreading knowledge across firms.
中文摘要
劳动力流动限制的支持者认为，创新激励足以抵消对工人的损害。然而，此类政策对创新的因果效应仍是一个悬而未决的实证问题。利用各州竞业禁止协议可执行性看似外生的变化，我们发现其对创新产生了显著的负面影响。对于最具新颖性和创新性的专利及企业而言，这种负面效应甚至更大。进一步分析表明，这些对创新的负面影响无法仅用市场进入来解释，而更可能源于知识流动的减少。我们的研究结果表明，劳动力流动在跨企业知识传播中发挥着关键作用。