Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
频谱拍卖与移动市场竞争的互动：理论与欧洲4G拍卖证据综述
Interaction of spectrum auctions and mobile market competition: Review of theory and evidence from European 4G auctions
摘要
This paper examines the effects of ex ante market structure on spectrum auctions and their impact on mobile market outcomes. We review the relevant theory and provide a simple analytic framework suggesting that larger incumbents acquire more spectrum in auctions to disadvantage smaller competitors. Using novel data on European 4G spectrum auctions, we present suggestive evidence of this effect for low-band ( < 1GHz) auctions. Exploiting idiosyncratic differences in auction timing across countries, we show that HHIs, and potentially prices, increase following low-band auctions, particularly in markets where incumbent operators had relatively high pre-auction market shares. These changes are not accompanied by improvements in coverage or increased investment. Operator-level regressions show that these effects are driven by incumbent operator behaviour.
中文摘要
本文考察了事前市场结构对频谱拍卖的影响及其对移动市场结果的作用。我们回顾了相关理论，并提供了一个简洁的分析框架，表明规模较大的在位运营商在拍卖中获取更多频谱，以削弱较小竞争对手的地位。利用欧洲4G频谱拍卖的新数据，我们为低频段（<1GHz）拍卖中的这一效应提供了提示性证据。利用各国拍卖时间上的特有差异，我们显示，在低频段拍卖后，赫芬达尔指数（HHIs）以及潜在的价格会上升，尤其是在拍卖前在位运营商市场份额相对较高的市场中。这些变化并未伴随覆盖范围的改善或投资的增加。运营商层面的回归分析表明，这些效应主要由在位运营商的行为驱动。