Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
恶意竞拍者参与的相互依赖价值拍卖
Interdependent‐value auctions with spiteful bidders
摘要
I study the interaction between spiteful preferences and interdependent values in auctions. While spite causes overbidding in both auction formats, interdependent values affect spiteful bidders' incentives differently depending on the auction format. Relative to independent values, bidders with interdependent values are less affected by spite in first‐price auctions, but more affected in second‐price auctions: the decrease in bid shading is smaller in the former, while the increase in above‐value bidding is greater in the latter. This format‐dependent behaviour reflects the trade‐off between increased competitiveness driven by spite and caution induced by the winner's curse.
中文摘要
本文研究了拍卖中恶意偏好与相互依存价值的交互作用。尽管恶意行为在两种拍卖形式中均导致过度出价，但相互依存价值对恶意竞拍者激励的影响因拍卖形式而异。相较于独立价值，具有相互依存价值的竞拍者在第一价格拍卖中受恶意影响较小，但在第二价格拍卖中受恶意影响更大：前者中出价折扣的降幅较小，而后者中高于价值出价的增幅较大。这种依赖于拍卖形式的行为，反映了恶意驱动的竞争性增强与赢家诅咒引发的谨慎性之间的权衡。