Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
临时协议
Interim agreements
摘要
Processes of bargaining are studied in which the players reach interim agreements that serve as status quo points for further bargaining. This is modeled in Nash’s setup of bargaining problems, where the solution is a time parameterized path of interim agreements rather than a single point. We characterize path solutions for linear problems that satisfy the axioms of restarting and covariance , and show that if a Pareto efficient agreement is not reached immediately, then it is never reached in finite time. Adding the axioms of individual rationality , relevance , and monotonicity , we characterize the family of continuous Raiffa solutions and show that these solutions converge to a Pareto efficient agreement but never reach it in finite time. Finally, if a deadline is added to the bargaining problem, and the speed of bargaining is proportionally inverse to the deadline, then a Pareto efficient agreement is reached exactly at the deadline.
中文摘要
本文研究了谈判过程中各方达成临时协议的过程，这些临时协议作为进一步谈判的现状点。该过程在纳什谈判问题框架下建模，其解是一条以时间为参数的临时协议路径，而非单一协议点。我们刻画了满足重启公理和协方差公理的线性问题的路径解，并证明若帕累托有效协议未立即达成，则有限时间内永远无法达成。通过引入个体理性、相关性和单调性公理，我们刻画了连续Raiffa解族，并证明这些解收敛于帕累托有效协议，但有限时间内无法达成。最后，若在谈判问题中加入截止期限，且谈判速度与截止期限成反比，则帕累托有效协议恰好在截止期限时达成。