Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
临时信息设计与买方最优定价
Interim Information Design And Buyer-Optimal Pricing
摘要
We study efficient and buyer-surplus maximizing information policies in a bilateral trade setting where the buyer is initially privately imperfectly informed about his willingness to pay. We identify a canonical class of demand functions that can be implemented by information disclosures that are targeted based on the buyer’s initial private information. As an application we show that providing more information to the buyer can lead to higher market prices and a lower trade probability without affecting the buyer or seller surplus.
中文摘要
我们研究了在双边贸易环境中，买方最初对其支付意愿拥有私人但不完全信息时的有效且最大化买方剩余的信息政策。我们识别出一类典型的需求函数，这些函数可通过基于买方初始私人信息定向披露的信息来实现。作为一个应用，我们表明，向买方提供更多信息可能导致更高的市场价格和更低的交易概率，而不影响买方或卖方剩余。