Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
内生多归属下广告融资平台的互操作性
Interoperability Between Ad‐Financed Platforms With Endogenous Multi‐Homing
摘要
Platform interoperability is considered a powerful tool to promote competition in digital markets when network effects are at play. We study the incentives of two competing ad-funded platforms to provide interoperability in a setting where consumers can single-home or multi-home and decide how much time to spend online. When the platforms are symmetric, perfect interoperability emerges in equilibrium and is socially efficient. When a larger platform has an installed base of customers, its incentive to make its services interoperable is lower than for the smaller platform. Interoperability does not emerge in equilibrium if the installed base is sufficiently large. However, mandating interoperability between the asymmetric platforms is not always socially optimal.
中文摘要
平台互操作性被视为在网络效应发挥作用时促进数字市场竞争的有力工具。我们研究了在消费者可以选择单归属或多归属并决定在线时间投入的背景下，两家竞争性广告支持型平台提供互操作性的激励。当平台对称时，完全互操作性在均衡中出现且具有社会效率。当较大平台拥有既定的客户基础时，其提供互操作服务的激励低于较小平台。若既定基础足够大，互操作性不会在均衡中出现。然而，强制不对称平台之间的互操作性并非总是社会最优的。