Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
信息不对称下的区域间溢出效应与最优预算制度
Interregional spillovers and optimal budget institutions under asymmetric information
摘要
We analyze optimal budget institutions for local governments in a scenario where local public goods generate positive interregional externalities, such as environmental protection. There is a central government (referred to as the center) and two regions. Each region possesses private information regarding the extent of beneficial spillovers it experiences from the public goods provided by the other region. To achieve constrained efficiency, it is necessary to address these externalities while also tackling the center’s self-selection issue in the presence of asymmetric information. One way to implement the optimal solution under asymmetric information is through a simultaneous-move equilibrium. The center can set a minimum debt level for the region that generates higher spillovers and impose a Pigouvian tax on the region benefiting more from spillovers, subsequently transferring the revenue as a subsidy to the other region. Alternatively, a sequential-move equilibrium can implement the asymmetric information optimum with the additional condition that the follower region’s optimal debt choice is concave in the leader region’s debt choice.
中文摘要
我们分析地方政府在地方公共品产生正向跨区域外部性（如环境保护）情境下的最优预算制度。存在一个中央政府（简称中心）和两个地区。每个地区对于从另一地区提供的公共品中获得的有利溢出程度拥有私人信息。为实现受限效率，必须解决这些外部性，同时应对信息不对称条件下中心的自选择问题。在信息不对称下实施最优解的一种方式是通过同时行动均衡。中心可以为产生较高溢出效应的地区设定最低债务水平，并对从溢出中受益更多的地区征收庇古税，随后将税收收入作为补贴转移给另一地区。或者，顺序行动均衡可以在附加条件下实施信息不对称最优解，即跟随地区的最优债务选择是领导地区债务选择的凹函数。