Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
司法绩效与公共采购选择
Judicial performance and public procurement choice
摘要
This paper investigates whether judicial performance influences the choice of procurement procedures adopted by public authorities. Using data on Italian municipal public works contracts between 2009 and 2012, it examines the choice between negotiated procedures and formal tendering mechanisms in a range where both options were legally available. Identification relies on a spatial discontinuity design that exploits exogenous variation in judicial delay across court jurisdictions, further refined through intra-regional border comparisons and coarsened exact matching. The results show that longer judicial delays significantly reduce the likelihood of using negotiated procedures and increase the use of formal auctions. Consistent with a growing body of literature showing that inefficient courts increase contractual uncertainty, we argue that poor judicial performance shifts procurement choices toward highly formalized procurement mechanisms rather than more discretionary and market-oriented forms of contracting. In this sense, formal procurement procedures may partially compensate for weak judicial enforcement by shifting transaction governance toward greater ex-ante specification, procedural control, and verifiability. More broadly, the paper suggests that judicial ineffectiveness may contribute to the expansion of bureaucratic controls, shifting governance away from market-based arrangements and toward increasingly proceduralized administrative structures.
中文摘要
本文研究司法绩效是否影响公共机构对采购程序的选择。基于2009年至2012年意大利市政公共工程合同数据，本文考察在协商程序与正式招标机制均具法律可用性的区间内二者之间的选择。识别策略依赖于空间断点设计，利用不同法院辖区司法延迟的外生变异，并通过区域内边界比较和粗化精确匹配进一步加以精炼。结果表明，司法延迟越长，使用协商程序的可能性显著降低，而正式拍卖的使用增加。与越来越多文献所揭示的低效法院增加合同不确定性的结论相一致，我们认为，司法绩效不佳使采购选择转向高度形式化的采购机制，而非更具自由裁量性和市场导向的缔约形式。在此意义上，正式采购程序可能通过将交易治理转向更强的事前规定、程序控制和可验证性，部分补偿司法执行的薄弱。更广泛地看，本文表明司法无效可能促成官僚控制的扩张，使治理偏离基于市场的安排，转向日益程序化的行政结构。