Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
利益冲突下的游说行为
Lobbying under conflicting interests
摘要
A variation of a cheap talk game is considered in which the preferences of a special interest group conflict with those of a policymaker if she is benevolent; however, she may be corrupt. The interest group, which knows the state of the world, sends a message to the policymaker and may also exert costly lobbying effort for its preferred policy to be adopted. We show that expected welfare, which is the same in all PBE, is decreasing in the probability that the policymaker is corrupt. Surprisingly, it decreases faster when this probability is above one-half, suggesting that corrupt behavior will be tolerated only up to a certain level.
中文摘要
本文考虑了一种廉价交谈博弈的变体，其中特殊利益集团的偏好与政策制定者（若其廉洁）的偏好相冲突；然而，该政策制定者可能腐败。利益集团知晓世界状态，向政策制定者发送信息，并可能为其偏好的政策被采纳而付出代价高昂的游说努力。我们表明，在所有完美贝叶斯均衡（PBE）中相同的预期福利，随政策制定者腐败概率的增加而递减。令人惊讶的是，当这一概率超过二分之一时，福利下降得更快，这表明腐败行为仅在达到一定水平之前才会被容忍。