Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
长期战争
Long Wars
摘要
We study whether the Coase conjecture holds for bargaining during war. Two players, A and B, contest a divisible resource until one side collapses or agreement is reached. If player B is militarily strong, then he insists on getting a large share. However, player A only concedes this large share if player B credibly signals his strength by fighting a sufficiently long war. Thus, the Coase conjecture fails, and asymmetric information about military strength explains why long wars may be inevitable. Using a mechanism design approach, we derive a lower bound on the expected duration of war. (JEL C78, D74, D82, F51)
中文摘要
我们研究科斯猜想在战争期间的讨价还价中是否成立。两名参与者A和B争夺一种可分割资源，直至一方崩溃或达成协议。如果参与者B在军事上强大，他会坚持要求获得较大份额。然而，只有当参与者B通过进行足够长时间的战争来可信地传递其军事实力信号时，参与者A才会让出这一较大份额。因此，科斯猜想不成立，关于军事实力的信息不对称解释了为何长期战争可能不可避免。通过机制设计方法，我们推导出战争预期持续时间的下限。（JEL C78, D74, D82, F51）