Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
潜伏性专利权利要求与战略性许可合同
Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts
摘要
This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims. We show that the possibility of future patent claims makes it optimal to include a per‐unit royalty. The royalty reduces the surplus available to potential third‐party claimants and serves as a rent‐protection device, trading off allocative inefficiency against hold‐up risk. Restrictions on the contracting space can be justified when more realistic features of demand uncertainty or stochastic patent arrival are considered.
中文摘要
本文分析了当被许可方面临未知专利持有人未来侵权索赔风险时的最优许可合同。在非竞争性许可方与垄断制造商签订合同的背景下，若无此类索赔，固定费用许可为最优选择。研究表明，未来专利索赔的可能性使得引入单位特许权使用费成为最优方案。该使用费降低了潜在第三方索赔方可获得的剩余，并充当租金保护机制，在配置效率损失与敲竹杠风险之间进行权衡。当考虑需求不确定性或专利随机出现等更现实的特征时，对合同空间的限制具有合理性。