Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
高管薪酬上限的宏观经济影响
Macroeconomic Implications of Executive Pay Caps*,†
摘要
I study the introduction of statutory caps on executive pay ratios (pay caps) in a span-of-control economy with heterogeneous managerial talent. Managers hire fewer workers than they would in the absence of pay caps, and the marginal product of labour is not equalized among firms. The ability of the marginal manager declines. Inequality between managers and workers, and among managers, declines, but inequality among workers increases. Quantitatively, overall inequality decreases substantially, especially via a reduction in top income shares, but the GDP losses are also significant. In addition, the redistribution favours the “middle” deciles between 50 and 90, rather than the bottom 50% of the income distribution. Future work will build on this “first pass” to analyse the effect of pay caps in economies distorted by monopsony power, non-pecuniary benefits of control, and managerial rent extraction.
中文摘要
我研究在具有异质性管理才能的控制幅度经济中引入高管薪酬比率法定上限（薪酬上限）的影响。管理者雇佣的工人数量少于不存在薪酬上限时的水平，且劳动的边际产品在企业之间不再均等化。边际管理者的能力下降。管理者与工人之间以及管理者之间的不平等下降，但工人之间的不平等上升。在数量上，总体不平等显著下降，尤其是通过降低最高收入份额，但GDP损失也很显著。此外，再分配有利于第50至90百分位之间的“中间”十分位数，而非收入分布中最低的50%。未来的工作将在此基础上进一步分析在买方垄断势力、控制权非货币收益和管理者租金抽取所扭曲的经济中薪酬上限的影响。