Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
管理者过度自信与环境可持续性披露：一个具有三种披露选择的信号博弈
Managerial overconfidence and environmental sustainability disclosure: a signalling game with three disclosure choices
摘要
Greenwashing, strategic silence, and voluntary confession coexist and complicate environmental governance. We construct a signalling game model where environmentally informed firms select from three strategic signals. Incorporating consumer heterogeneity produces continuous demand response, and an overconfidence parameter lowers managers’ subjective audit probability. Analysis shows overconfidence progressively destabilizes transparent information transmission: as optimism rises, penalty deterrence weakens, voluntary confession incentive decreases, which triggers sequential collapse of separating equilibria and ultimately shifts market dynamics to pooling on false claims. The study reveals regulatory asymmetry: ex-post punishment loses effectiveness as overconfidence increases, while ex-ante structural barriers like stringent verification maintain robust deterrence. Our results support a regulatory shift from ex-post punishment to ex-ante verification.
中文摘要
漂绿、策略性沉默与自愿坦白并存，使环境治理趋于复杂。本文构建一个信号博弈模型，其中掌握环境信息的企业从三种策略性信号中进行选择。引入消费者异质性产生连续的需求响应，而过度自信参数则降低管理者的主观审计概率。分析表明，过度自信会逐步破坏透明信息传递的稳定性：随着乐观程度上升，惩罚威慑减弱，自愿坦白激励下降，进而引发分离均衡的相继崩溃，并最终使市场动态转向在虚假声明上的混同。研究揭示了监管不对称性：随着过度自信增加，事后惩罚失去有效性，而严格核查等事前结构性壁垒则保持稳健的威慑力。研究结果支持监管重心从事后惩罚转向事前核查。