Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
营销合作社在空间采购市场中的市场与福利效应
Market and welfare effects of marketing cooperatives in spatial procurement markets
摘要
Agricultural marketing cooperatives are widely viewed as a mechanism for mitigating oligopsony power in agricultural procurement markets. However, the welfare effects of cooperatives depend on how competing investor‐owned firms respond, and those responses vary with the strategic flexibility available to firms. This paper studies how spatial price discrimination and endogenous location mediate the market and welfare effects of cooperatives in spatial procurement markets. Using a structured counterfactual framework, we compare markets with only investor‐owned firms and mixed markets with both investor‐owned firms and cooperatives across four strategic environments defined by the availability of these strategic margins. We find that strategic flexibility generally attenuates the welfare gains generated by cooperative entry, particularly at low and intermediate transportation costs. This attenuation arises because strategic flexibility increases efficiency in benchmark markets with only investor‐owned firms, leaving less scope for cooperatives to improve market performance. Consequently, strategic flexibility and cooperative ownership emerge as partially substitutable mechanisms for improving procurement‐market performance. Cooperatives therefore deliver their largest welfare gains where competing firms face greater strategic constraints arising from regulation, technology, or physical limitations.
中文摘要
农业营销合作社被广泛视为缓解农产品采购市场中寡头买方垄断力量的一种机制。然而，合作社的福利效应取决于相互竞争的投资者所有企业如何回应，而这些回应又随企业可用的战略灵活性而变化。本文研究空间价格歧视与内生区位如何调节合作社在空间采购市场中的市场效应与福利效应。我们采用结构化反事实框架，在由这些战略边际可得性所定义的四种战略环境中，比较仅有投资者所有企业的市场与同时包含投资者所有企业和合作社的混合市场。我们发现，战略灵活性通常会削弱合作社进入所带来的福利收益，尤其是在低运输成本和中等运输成本情形下。这种削弱之所以出现，是因为战略灵活性提高了仅有投资者所有企业的基准市场的效率，从而留给合作社改善市场绩效的空间更小。因此，战略灵活性与合作社所有权成为改善采购市场绩效的部分可替代机制。由此，合作社在竞争企业因监管、技术或物理限制而面临更大战略约束的情形下带来最大的福利收益。