Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
逆向选择下的企业并购
Mergers in the Presence of Adverse Selection
摘要
In the presence of adverse selection, mergers can increase welfare through a reduction in inefficient sorting. I characterize the sorting externality internalized between merging firms in a tractable discrete choice model. Mergers benefit consumers when the firms are small, willingness to pay is moderately increasing in cost, and consumer costs are skewed. Applying the model to the non‐group health insurance market, 13% of potential mergers would improve consumer surplus. In markets where the sorting distortion exceeds $5 per person, nearly one‐third of mergers improve consumer surplus, highlighting the importance of considering adverse selection in merger evaluation.
中文摘要
在逆向选择存在的情况下，并购可以通过减少低效分类来提高福利。我在一个易于处理的离散选择模型中刻画了并购企业之间内部化的分类外部性。当企业规模较小、支付意愿随成本适度递增且消费者成本呈偏态分布时，并购对消费者有利。将该模型应用于非团体健康保险市场，13%的潜在并购将改善消费者剩余。在分类扭曲超过每人5美元的市场中，近三分之一的并购会提升消费者剩余，这凸显了在并购评估中考虑逆向选择的重要性。