Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
在无外部选项的匹配市场中最小化操纵
Minimizing manipulation in matching markets without outside options
摘要
In two-sided matching markets without outside options, we compare mechanisms in terms of the number of agents who can manipulate them. Despite the existence of several stable mechanisms that are strategy-proof for one side of the market, we show that there is only one such mechanism that stable-minimizes manipulation: the deferred acceptance mechanism with the short side making proposals. Surprisingly, the Boston mechanism may have fewer manipulators than any stable mechanism. We adapt our main results to markets where only one side has outside options and to many-to-one markets without outside options.
中文摘要
在不存在外部选项的双边匹配市场中，我们从能够操纵机制的代理人数量角度对机制进行比较。尽管存在若干对市场一方而言是策略防伪的稳定机制，我们证明，只有一个这样的机制能在稳定机制中最小化操纵：由短边提出申请的延迟接受机制。令人惊讶的是，波士顿机制可能比任何稳定机制拥有更少的操纵者。我们将主要结果推广到仅有一方拥有外部选项的市场，以及不存在外部选项的多对一市场。