Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
电动汽车市场最优激励机制建模
Modeling optimal incentives for the electric vehicle market
摘要
Governments face increasing pressure to meet legally binding net-zero targets, requiring a rapid transition from internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles to electric vehicles (EVs). Designing effective incentive schemes is challenging because vehicle fleets adjust slowly, policy interventions are fiscally costly, and electrification erodes fuel-tax revenues. This paper develops a dynamic policy evaluation framework that combines cross-country evidence on EV adoption with long-run fleet dynamics under uncertainty. Using both the United Kingdom and France as case studies, we simulate optimal time paths of EV purchase incentives under alternative policy objectives, including terminal fleet targets, sales-based penalties, and fiscal revenue considerations. The results reveal three core findings. First, stock-based (terminal) penalties may delay intervention but strongly stabilize long-run fleet outcomes, while sales-based penalties induce earlier but less targeted action. Second, dependence on fuel-tax revenues creates a fiscal lock-in mechanism that weakens optimal electrification incentives. Third, the effectiveness of subsidy programs depends critically on consumer responsiveness to price incentives. Overall, the analysis shows that EV transition policy is best evaluated jointly with fiscal reform and long-run fleet dynamics. Well-timed and fiscally coherent intervention can substantially reduce emissions while limiting long-term budgetary risks.
中文摘要
各国政府面临越来越大的压力，必须实现具有法律约束力的净零目标，这要求从内燃机（ICE）车辆向电动汽车（EV）快速转型。设计有效的激励机制具有挑战性，因为车队调整缓慢、政策干预的财政成本高昂，并且电动化会侵蚀燃油税收入。本文构建了一个动态政策评估框架，将关于电动汽车采用的跨国证据与不确定性下的长期车队动态相结合。我们以英国和法国作为案例研究，模拟在替代政策目标下电动汽车购置激励的最优时间路径，这些目标包括终端车队目标、基于销量的惩罚以及财政收入考量。结果揭示了三个核心发现。第一，基于存量（终端）的惩罚可能会延迟干预，但会强烈稳定长期车队结果，而基于销量的惩罚则会诱发更早但针对性较弱的行动。第二，对燃油税收入的依赖会形成财政锁定机制，从而削弱最优电动化激励。第三，补贴项目的有效性关键取决于消费者对价格激励的响应程度。总体而言，分析表明，电动汽车转型政策最好与财政改革和长期车队动态结合起来评估。时机恰当且财政上协调一致的干预可以在限制长期预算风险的同时大幅减少排放。