Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
不完全竞争银行下的货币与宏观审慎政策
Monetary and macroprudential policy with imperfectly competitive banks
摘要
We study the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy when banks have market power and funding costs are subject to a lower bound. In a Cournot loan market, banks lend more than a macroprudential authority’s target, and the authority can implement its target with a state-contingent capital requirement. Above the funding floor, a monetary tightening raises the target-implementing capital ratio. Below the floor, the target-implementing capital ratio becomes unresponsive to monetary policy.
中文摘要
我们研究当银行具有市场势力且融资成本受到下限约束时，货币政策与宏观审慎政策之间的相互作用。在古诺贷款市场中，银行的贷款量超过宏观审慎当局的目标，而当局可以通过状态依存的资本要求来实现其目标。在融资下限之上，货币紧缩会提高实现目标所需的资本比率。在融资下限之下，实现目标所需的资本比率对货币政策变得不敏感。