Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
垄断与多零售商双渠道分销
Monopoly Versus Dual‐Channel Distribution With Multiple Retailers
摘要
This paper examines how downstream competition shapes a manufacturer's decision to adopt a dual‐channel structure—supplying independent retailers via secret two‐part tariff contracts while also operating a direct channel. We show that the shape of the inverse demand function plays a key role in this decision. Under strictly concave demand, expanding total output raises price sensitivity, while the manufacturer responds less aggressively through its direct channel. These effects lead to a sharp price drop, discouraging aggressive retailer behavior and favoring a dual‐channel structure. In contrast, under strictly convex demand, output expansion reduces price sensitivity, and the manufacturer retreats aggressively. The resulting mild price decline leads each retailer to believe that its own output increase has little market impact, encouraging aggressive competition. As a result, with multiple retailers, the manufacturer may avoid supplying the indirect channel even when only two retailers are present. We further show that under the dual‐channel structure, a higher direct‐channel cost can increase consumer surplus by overly shifting output toward the more efficient indirect channel.
中文摘要
本文考察下游竞争如何塑造制造商采用双渠道结构的决策——即通过秘密两部收费契约向独立零售商供货，同时经营直销渠道。我们表明，反需求函数的形状在这一决策中发挥关键作用。在严格凹需求下，扩大总产出会提高价格敏感度，而制造商通过其直销渠道的回应则不那么激进。这些效应导致价格急剧下降，抑制零售商的激进行为，从而有利于双渠道结构。相反，在严格凸需求下，产出扩张会降低价格敏感度，制造商则激进地收缩。由此产生的温和价格下降使每个零售商相信自身产出的增加对市场影响甚微，从而鼓励激进竞争。因此，在存在多个零售商时，即使只有两个零售商，制造商也可能避免向间接渠道供货。我们进一步表明，在双渠道结构下，较高的直销渠道成本可能通过将产出过度转向更有效率的间接渠道而提高消费者剩余。